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ABSTRACT 
Framing and default effects have been studied for more 
than a decade in different disciplines. A common criticism 
of these studies is that they use hypothetical scenarios. In 
this study, we developed a real decision environment: a 
Facebook application in which users had to decide whether 
or not they wanted to be automatically publicly tagged in 
their friends’ pictures and/or tag their friends in their own 
pictures. To ensure ecological validity, participants had to 
log in to their Facebook account. Our results confirmed 
previous studies indicating a higher tagging rate in 
positively framed and accept-by-default conditions. 
Furthermore, we introduced a manipulation that we 
assumed would overshadow and thereby reduce the effects 
of default and framing: a justification highlighting a 
positive or negative descriptive social norm or giving a 
rationale for or against tagging. We found that such 
justifications may at times increase tagging rates. 
Keywords 
Default effect, framing effect, privacy nudge, Facebook 
privacy, photo tagging, Facebook application. 
INTRODUCTION 
Social network users are required to make privacy deci-
sions on a regular basis. These decisions are susceptible to 
framing effects (irrational influences of the way an option 
is presented to the user on the outcome of their decision 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981)) and default effects (similar 
influences of the option that is chosen by default 
(Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988)). Johnson et al. (2002) 
and Lai and Hui (2006) independently found framing and 
default effects to have a significant impact on users’ pri-
vacy decisions (i.e., their willingness to be notified con-
cerning other health surveys or to receive a newsletter). 
Both studies showed users a checkbox with a label. The 
framing was manipulated via the label wording (“Please 
send me newsletters” versus “Please do not send me 
newsletters”). The default was manipulated by whether the 
checkbox was initially set to accept or reject the 
newsletters. Both studies found that framing and defaults 
have a separate and additive effect on users’ decisions. 
A common criticism of default and framing studies is that 
they involve hypothetical scenarios: users are not moti-
vated to indicate their true preferences. The decisions we 
investigate in the current study involve consenting to 
(automatically) tagging oneself in one’s friends’ Facebook 
pictures and tagging one’s friends in one’s own pictures. 
To ensure ecological validity, users had to log in to their 
Facebook account, and hence they perceived real risks and 
real benefits as a consequence of their decisions. 
We conducted a study measuring users’ acceptance (the 
“tagging rate”) of such an automatic photo-tagging system. 
We integrate default and framing effects, and we introduce 
a method that is hypothesized to overshadow and thereby 
reduce these effects: In some experimental conditions, we 
provide a “justification” that highlights a presumed 
positive or negative descriptive social norm of using the 
photo-tagging system (“3%” vs. “97% of participants used 
the auto-tagger”); in other conditions, this justification 
provides a rationale for or against tagging (“the tagged 
pictures could be embarrassing” vs. “tagging may increase 
your social bond”); a final condition showed no 
justification. Depending on the underlying cause of the 
default and framing effects, either of these justifications 
should be able to reduce the default and framing effects. 
RELATED WORK AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Main effects of framing and defaults 
Levin and Gearth (1988) argue that a positive frame elicits 
arguments in favor of the action, while a negative frame 
elicits arguments against the action. Hardisty et al. (2009) 
demonstrate that this effect is mediated by the order in 
which decision-makers evaluate positive and negative 
arguments (the “query theory”). A positive (negative) 
frame causes users to evaluate positive (negative) argu-
ments first. Because of this, the majority of arguments they 
evaluate are positive (negative), and they end up more 
(less) likely to consent. Alternatively, framing can be 
explained as a normative effect: a decision-maker may 
interpret the positive (negative) framing of a decision as 
representing the positive (negative) attitude the requester 
has towards the decision (Sher & McKenzie, 2006). As 
such, a positive frame suggests an injunctive norm 
supporting the decision, while a negative frame suggests an 
injunctive norm against the decision. 
In our study on Facebook photo tagging, framing is 
manifested in whether users are given the option to apply 
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the automated tagging procedure, or rather the option to 
NOT apply it. Based on existing evidence (Johnson et al., 
2002; Lai & Hui, 2006), and given that framing effects can 
be explained by the query theory and injunctive social 
norms (Hardisty & Weber, 2009; Sher & McKenzie, 2006), 
we state the following hypothesis: 
H1: A positive framing results in a higher tagging rate than 
a negative framing. 
Dinner et al. (2011) present three possible causes of default 
effects. The first two causes have to do with the effort of 
choosing the default, either in terms of physical effort 
(Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988) or mental effort (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1974). As a third cause, they demonstrate 
that the query theory can explain default effects: a positive 
(negative) default causes users to evaluate positive 
(negative) arguments first, which makes them more (less) 
likely to consent with the request. Finally, McKenzie et al. 
(2006) show that people tend to infer the attitude of the 
messenger not only from the framing of a request but also 
from the default option. Combined with a framing effect, a 
default endorsement of the framed option may reinforce the 
implicit social norm communicated by the message 
framing. 
In our study, the default setting is manifested in whether 
the automated tagging procedure will be applied or rather 
NOT applied if the user simply does not change the current 
setting. Based on existing evidence (Johnson et al., 2002; 
Lai & Hui, 2006), and given that default effects can be 
explained by cognitive and mental effort, query theory, and 
injunctive social norms (Dinner et al., 2011; McKenzie et 
al., 2006), we state the following hypothesis: 
H2: The Tag by Default conditions result in a higher 
tagging rate than the Do Not Tag by Default conditions.  
Effect moderators 
Framing and defaults are often considered harmful because 
they may cause users to behave counter to their “true 
preferences” (John, Acquisti, & Loewenstein, 2011). Here 
we describe two interventions that may diminish or even 
eradicate their effect. These moderators have not been 
studied in prior work, but their effectiveness can be 
hypothesized based on the psychological mechanisms that 
may underlie the framing and default effects.  
Studies have shown that for a norm to influence people’s 
behavior; it has to be focal  (Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 
1991). So, when two normative cues provide conflicting 
information, people are more likely to behave in 
accordance with the norm expressed by the most salient 
cue. Given that both framing and default effects can be 
explained as an injunctive social norm (McKenzie et al., 
2006; Sher & McKenzie, 2006), we hypothesize that a 
sufficiently salient and conflicting descriptive social norm 
can reduce or even eradicate the framing and default 
effects. In our study on Facebook photo tagging, this 
descriptive social norm takes the form of a “justification” 
indicating that either a small minority or a large majority 
of all other participants have chosen to use the automated 
tagging procedure. We state the following hypotheses: 
H3: Normative cues moderate the effect of framing on 
tagging: A conflicting norm (negative cue + positively 
framed decision or positive cue + negatively framed 
decision) will reduce the difference in tagging rates 
between the positive and negative framing conditions. 
H4: Normative cues moderate the effect of defaults on 
tagging: A conflicting norm (negative cue + tag by default 
or positive cue + do not tag) will reduce the difference in 
tagging rates between the Tag by Default and Do Not Tag 
by Default conditions. 
According to the query theory, the framing of a request 
(Hardisty & Weber, 2009) and the default (Dinner et al., 
2011) influence the order in which people query their 
minds for positive and negative arguments: they will 
evaluate arguments in favor of the frame/default and 
against the alternative first, before they evaluate arguments 
against the frame/default and in favor of the alternative. 
This will, in turn, increase their likelihood to decide in the 
direction of the frame/default. As a means to counter the 
query-ordering effect of respectively framing and defaults, 
researchers have attempted to “force” participants to ask 
queries in a specific order. Indeed, when participants are 
asked to do this, the framing and default effects disappear, 
and participants’ decisions simply follow the imposed 
query order (Dinner et al., 2011; Hardisty & Weber, 2009).  
From the perspective of an (online) application, however, 
forcing users to follow a certain query order is unwanted if 
not infeasible. Hence, we introduce query supporting 
rationales which arguably encourage users to give 
precedence to the queries in line with this rationale. If this 
is indeed the case, then we expect users’ decisions to 
simply follow the rationale-supported query order, and the 
framing and default effects will disappear: 
H5: Query-supporting rationale-based cues moderate the 
effect of framing on tagging rates: A conflicting rationale 
will reduce the difference in tagging rates between the 
positive and negative framing conditions. 
H6: Query-supporting rationale-based cues moderate the 
effect of defaults on tagging rates: A conflicting rationale 
will reduce the difference in tagging rates between the Tag 
by Default and Do Not Tag by Default conditions. 
METHOD 
Participants were told that we are developing a Facebook 
application that can automatically tag people in pictures. 
We recruited 924 participants (plus 50 pilot participants) 
through online platforms. They were paid $1.30 for their 
participation. We required participants to have an active 
Facebook account with at least ten friends. On average, 
participants had 427 Facebook friends. 
Participants were asked to log into Facebook, giving basic 
profile and friends list permissions to our app. They were 
then informed about the benefits and consequences of 
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using the application, making the value proposition of the 
eventual decision unambiguously clear for all participants. 
They were then asked to tag the people in four researcher-
provided photos, followed by a phase where they would 
correct mistakes in photos that were ostensibly tagged by 
the algorithm. We made sure that participants would have 
to make no corrections at all, so as to demonstrate that the 
algorithm was accurate and reliable.  
Participants would then be given the opportunity to use the 
auto-tagging procedure themselves—a question we 
manipulated in terms of default, framing, and justification. 
In our pilot study, we gave participants the option to tag 
themselves in all of their friends’ photos, and to tag all of 
their friends in all of their own photos. However, none of 
the participants accepted this offer, regardless of the 
experimental condition (a testament to the realism of our 
study, but a problem nonetheless). To reduce the overall 
risk of the decision, we reduced its scope: We asked 
participants for the names of three Facebook friends they 
regularly interact with, developed a decision page for each 
of these friends, “identified” a number of “previously 
unseen photos” (in reality, a random number between 5 and 
15), and offered participants to tag themselves and/or their 
friend in those photos (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. An example experimental condition (accept 
by default, positive framing, negative rationale-based 
justification) in the “decision” phase of the study. 
Manipulations 
The study follows a 2x2x5 between-subjects design. Like 
most existing studies on defaults and framing, it combines 
a default setting manipulation (accept versus reject) with a 
framing manipulation (positive versus negative) as shown 
in Table 1. We add a “justification” manipulation, with two 
normative justifications (positive/negative), two rationale-
based justifications (positive and negative), and a condition 
with no justification: 
1. Negative descriptive normative justification: “(Note: 
3% of our study participants chose this option)”  
2. Positive descriptive normative justification: “(Note: 
97% of our study participants chose this option)”  
3. Negative rationale-based justification: “(Note: Auto-
tagged photos will show up on the Facebook walls of 
the tagged friends, where their friends can see them. 
Beware that they may not want others (parents, boss) 
to see some of these photos, because they could be 
embarrassing!)” 
4. Positive rationale-based justification: “(Note: Auto-
tagged photos will show up on the Facebook walls of 
the tagged friends, where their friends can see them. 
This will strengthen your friendship and let your 
friends relive the good times they had with you!)” 
5. None 
Final questionnaires 
In the final part, participants were asked to list reasons to 
use or not to use the auto-tagger to tag themselves in their 
friend’s pictures and their friend in their own pictures, for 
each of the three friends. Participants were then debriefed 
about the purpose of the study and ascertained that the 
auto-tagger was fake and had not tagged any of their 
photos. This study was certified by an institutional review 
board and researchers addressed all ethical concerns. 
Table 1. The Default and Framing manipulations. 
Presentation Default Framing 
 Automatically tag me in 
those pictures. 
Accept Positive 
 Automatically tag me in 
those pictures. 
Reject Positive 
 Do NOT automatically tag 
me in those pictures. 
Reject Negative 
 Do NOT automatically tag 
me in those pictures. 
Accept Negative 
RESULTS 
Each participant made six yes/no decisions—for each of 
the three friends, they indicated whether they allowed the 
auto-tagger to tag their friend in their pictures and whether 
they allowed it to tag themselves in their friend’s pictures. 
We run multilevel logistic regressions with a random 
intercept to account for repeated measurements per 
participant. Our DV is the decision to allow/prevent the 
auto-tagger (tagging rate) and the default, framing, and 
justifications are the IVs. Justification is modeled as an 
interaction between “type” (none, normative, rationale-
based) and “valence” (positive, negative), with no 
distinction in valence in the “no justification” condition. 
We first analyzed the framing and default effects regardless 
of the justification (see Table 2), and found a significant 
positive main effect for both framing (H1) and defaults 
(H2), with no interaction effect between the two. Figure 2 
displays the framing and default effects 
Table 2. The effect of framing and defaults on tagging rate. 
  Odds ratio   p value  
Overall odds 0.143     
Default (tag vs. do not tag) 10.340   < .001 
Framing (pos. vs. neg.)  4.854 < .001  
Default x Framing 0.993  0.991  
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Figure 2. The effects of defaults and framing on tagging rate. 
Table 3. The effect of framing and justifications on tagging. 
  Odds ratio   p value  
Baseline odds (Just. = none) 0.210     
Justification type (vs. none)   
 Descriptive normative 0.805 .608 
 Rationale-based 0.514 .122 
Justification type x Valence   
 Descriptive normative 2.138 .105 
 Rationale-based 1.372 .523 
Framing (pos. vs. neg.)  4.558 .031 
Justification type x Framing   
 Descriptive normative 1.292 .762 
 Rationale-based 0.714 .695 
Just. x Valence x Framing   
 Descriptive normative 6.129  .053 
 Rationale-based 0.674 .690 
 
 
Figure 3. The effect of framing and justifications on tagging.  
To test H3 and H5, we ran a factorial model with framing, 
justification type and valence. Framing and valence were 
centered, but justification type was dummy-coded with 
“none” as baseline. Since valence only applies to the 
normative and rationale-based justification conditions, we 
exclude main effects of valence. Table 3 shows that there 
is no main effect of either of the two justifications, nor is 
their interaction with valence significant. In the “no 
justification” condition, framing has a significant overall 
effect. There is no significant overall interaction between 
framing and justification type, but there is a marginally 
significant interaction between framing, justification, and 
valence in the normative justification condition. However, 
this effect does not reduce or extinguish the default effect 
(H3). Rather, Figure 4 shows that the framing effect is 
stronger in the positive normative cue condition.  
To test H4 and H6, we ran a similar model with defaults, 
justification type, and valence. We did not run the two 
models together due to convergence issues. Table 4 shows 
that in the “no justification” condition, defaults have a 
marginally significant effect. There is also a significant 
interaction between defaults and justification type: the 
effect of defaults is ~7 times larger in the rationale-based 
condition (see rightmost panel of Figure 4). This effect is 
contrary to H4 and H6, which predicted that justifications 
would weaken the default effect. There is also no three-way 
interaction, i.e., the default-exacerbating effect of the 
rationale-based justification occurs regardless of valence. 
Table 4. The effect of defaults and justifications on tagging. 
  Odds ratio   p value  
Baseline odds (Just. = none) 0.225     
Justification type (vs. none)   
 Descriptive normative 0.695 .383 
 Rationale-based 0.460 .068 
Justification type x Valence   
 Descriptive normative 2.585 .043 
 Rationale-based 1.376 .522 
Default (tag vs. do not tag)  3.355 .079 
Justification type x Default   
 Descriptive normative 2.446 .283 
 Rationale-based 7.065 .022 
Just. x Valence x Default   
 Descriptive normative 0.470 .420 
 Rationale-based 1.583 .646 
 
 
Figure 4. The effect of defaults and justifications on tagging. 
DISCUSSION 
We were able to confirm framing and default effects in the 
context of photo tagging on Facebook. This proved to be a 
very realistic environment—the surprising results of our 
pilot study suggest that participants strongly believed that 
the photos would be tagged if they accepted the offer. 
Hence, we demonstrate that default and framing effects are 
not just an artifact of studies with unmotivated participants: 
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these effects persist even when participants are highly 
motivated to make the correct decision.  
In contrast to our hypotheses, the justifications were not 
able to reduce framing and default effects. This suggests 
that these effects persist even in light of appeals to norms 
and rationales. We did, however, find that positive norma-
tive cues can boost tagging rate in combination with 
positive framing, while positive rationale-based justifi-
cations support participation in the positive default con-
dition. Thus, it seems that justifications that are consistent 
with the framing or default setting may increase tagging 
rates (i.e., reduce privacy concerns).  
It needs to be acknowledged that in the baseline condition 
only approximately 25% of participants decided to opt-in 
to the auto picture tagging. Thus, another experiment is 
necessary investigating the described effects in a situation 
where the opt-in is more common. This will help us 
identify whether conceptually consistent justifications 
always have a concern-diminishing effect, or whether they 
may also help increase privacy-oriented behavior. 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Our study was conducted in a Facebook environment, so 
we cannot generalize our findings to other privacy settings. 
Second, we did not test the assumed underlying 
mechanisms like cognitive effort or normative pressure of 
the default, framing, and justification manipulations. Thus, 
more research is necessary to control for covariates and 
check the effects of our manipulations in order to establish 
causality. Also, follow-up studies must consider additional 
variables. To test for the general efficacy of justifications, 
future research needs to include a neutral default and 
framing condition to ultimately assess main effects of 
justifications. Lastly, our study was conducted in a static 
environment. In order to analyze the dissipation of framing 
and default effects, future research needs to apply repeated 
decision scenarios over time.  
CONCLUSION 
This study attempted to overcome framing and default 
effects in privacy decision making in a realistic experiment 
by introducing normative and rationale-based 
justifications. Instead, we ultimately found a mechanism to 
further increase framing and default effects under certain 
circumstances. If justifications were conceptually 
complementary to the initial decision bias and both 
proposed giving up privacy, tagging rates were even higher 
than under simple framing and default conditions.  
These findings provide considerable contributions for 
research and practice. Theoretically, we extend findings 
from existing work on default and framing effects to 
collaborative privacy management on online social 
networks. Moreover, we included potential moderators of 
the default and framing effects that could serve as instru-
ments to detect the underlying causes of the default and 
framing effects. Generally, our findings point towards the 
dangers of justifications in combination with established 
biases which may induce users to act irresponsibly. 
Platform managers need to carefully consider our findings 
when offering privacy decisions so as to not accidentally 
urge users to compromise their privacy against their will. 
Also, we inform users about these effects that they need to 
mind when making privacy-related decisions.    
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